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Abstract 
The agricultural policies of the United States and the People’s Republic of China have differed substantially given the 
governmental structures of each nation. During the 1930s, the U.S. federal government began a host of regulatory agricultural 
programs designed to improve the farm economy and lift agriculture from the Great Depression. Although many farmers 
participated in crop reduction and price support programs, they had little choice. The federal government did not force farmers to 
participate in its price support, crop reduction, and loan programs, but they felt compelled to do so in order to gain needed 
economic assistance, that is, money. Since the New Deal program of the 1930s, agricultural policy in the United States has been
based on supply side economics, and agricultural organizations have been effective lobbyists in Congress to support their own 
interests. U.S. agricultural policy, however, has encouraged farmers to leave the land for employment elsewhere as well as 
provided price supports and other income programs primarily for large-scale farmers and agricultural corporations rather than 
small-scale family farmers. The intent of this policy has been to ensure for those farmers who remain on the land an income and
standard of living comparable to urbanites. U.S. agricultural policy has undergone little substantial change since the early 1930s.
In contrast, the agricultural policy of the People’s Republic of China has undergone increasing change since World War II, but it
has been based on government purchases of agricultural commodities at fixed prices with requirements for some farmers to raise 
grain. Both of these features are designed to keep food prices low for the industrial and urban populations. Since the late 1970s, 
Chinese agricultural policy, however, has enabled rapid rural economic growth, provided improved market incentives, and led to 
the rapid development of food markets. By the twenty-first century market-oriented reform had become the major factor for 
agricultural growth, but the Chinese government also continued to support an agricultural policy designed to ensure an adequate
supply of grain at low cost, thereby privileging the industrial economy at the expense of agriculture. This agricultural policy also 
kept an increasing number of peasant farmers on the land with incomes and a standard of living considerably below urbanites. 
Although American and Chinese agricultural policies have sought food security and stability during the twentieth century, and 
while both nations provide incentives to improve agricultural income, both nations have pursued substantially different policies
to achieve those goals. The agricultural policy of each country has its advocates and critics. This paper provides a comparative, 
historical overview of the agricultural policies of both nations. 
© 2009 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
In 1949 the newly created People’s Republic of China and the United States confronted a host of agricultural 
problems that required the attention of both governments for the remainder of the twentieth century. In China 
agricultural production had decreased, inflation skyrocketed, and the food distribution system required organization. 
In the United States surplus production, particularly for grain, prevailed along with low prices and government price 
supports that placed an increasing drain on the treasury. The purpose in this brief paper is to highlight the main 
features of agricultural policy in China since the creation of the People’s Republic and the major provisions of farm 
policy in the United States after World War II. My intent is to identify mutual problems and sketch the policies 
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designed to resolve them in these different governmental systems. The political and economic complexities of the 
agricultural policies in both nations, of course, require far more analysis than can be presented here, and my 
observations are intended only to be suggestive for anyone teaching and writing about agricultural history from a 
transnational and comparative perspective.i
Post War Reorganization and Adaptation, 1949—1962 
At mid-point in the twentieth century, the Chinese government quickly established an agricultural policy that 
instituted land reforms, established a more equitable tax, and reduced rents. This multi-faceted agricultural policy 
also involved transferring land from local elites to the poor farmers, that is, the peasants. Government policy 
permitted successful farmers who cultivated no more than half a hectare to keep their lands, because these farmers 
contributed approximately 80 percent of the commodities marketed by village households, and these households 
comprised more than 20 percent of the households in a village. Absentee landlords also relinquished claims to 
village lands. These reforms substantially helped expand agricultural production with grain and cotton production 
increasing 6.2 and 18.7 percent annually through the 1957 crop year.ii
By late 1952, land distribution had been completed. Chinese agricultural policy now permitted several 
households to share labor during peak periods, such as planting and harvest time, and pool land. The government 
rewarded the eight to fifteen households that pooled their labor according to the resources that each contributed to 
the cooperative effort. Officials intended this policy to transfer Chinese agriculture slowly from family, that is, 
private, to collective farming. At this time, 60 percent of the agricultural households privately farmed independently, 
that is privately, not cooperatively. The other farmers worked on seasonal mutual aid teams.iii
By the mid-1950s, however, Chinese agricultural officials debated the “peasant question.” This discussion 
centered on whether the peasants should emphasize private agriculture or speed the process of cooperative farming. 
In 1955, Mao Zedong ended this debate by rejecting gradualism and requiring all private farmers to relinquish their 
land to the government which would reward them according to the work cooperatively performed. During the First 
Five Year Plan (1953—1957), Mao mandated that farmers sell their products, particularly grain, at low, arbitrary 
prices to the state. Cheap agricultural commodities would furnish light industries, such as flour milling, rice 
polishing, and shoe factories, while keeping urban food prices low, all of which privileged industrial development. 
Agricultural policy now also mandated the determination of grain procurements and household allocations each 
spring, and it set compulsory procurement quotas for three years in 1955. By late 1956, Chinese agriculture had 
been almost completely socialized with the organization of Agricultural Production Cooperatives which superseded 
the Mutual Aid Teams established during the early 1950s. The government also established credit, supply, and 
marketing cooperatives, but it restricted private action and essentially mandated participation by farmers in its 
agricultural program. This policy proved successful. Farmers now saw an opportunity to improve their income and 
standard of living, and the more prosperous peasants were not crushed as in the Soviet system. Grain and cotton 
production increased substantially before declining precipitously, due to mismanagement during the years of the 
Great Leap Forward (1958—1960). Private ownership of land, livestock, and tools were eliminated. This 
agricultural reform policy was the most significant since the seventh century during the early T’ang period when the 
government seized all lands and apportioned agricultural plots based on need.iv
By 1957 approximately 95 percent of all Chinese farmers had been organized into village Agricultural Production 
Cooperatives. For government officials, these agricultural cooperatives seemed the best way to increase agricultural 
production within a socialist system. Peasant dissatisfaction about the close of private markets and crop shortages, 
however, encouraged the government to provide a compromise solution for agricultural organization and 
production. Between 1958 and 1962 the government created a new agricultural organizational unit called the 
People’s Commune, which existed as a district in the county, comparable to a township or market town. Villages 
were renamed “production brigades” with farming teams of twenty to sixty households assigned to work the land. 
By 1959, 99 percent of all households had been organized into a commune. Private marketing had ended and the 
commune confiscated individually owned land and distributed net earnings on a per capita basis rather than 
according to one’s contribution in labor.v
In contrast, agricultural policy makers in the United States struggled to reconcile high wartime prices that farmers 
had come to expect with price depressing surplus production, particularly for grain and cotton. The influence of the 
farm lobby, that is, powerful agricultural organizations, remained strong because farmers and agriculturally 
6694  R. Douglas Hurt / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 41 (2010) 6692–6701 
dependant communities wielded an important vote at election time. High wartime production and prices posed 
significant problems for farmers, politicians and consumers. When the war ended farmers wanted to retain high 
wartime price supports rather than to return to the prewar policy of flexible price supports based on production.vi
The problems of production controls and price supports were complex, and no organization or lobbying group 
represented all famers nationwide. Specialization by farmers and regions often made agricultural interests 
contradictory, and no single policy could solve all farm problems. By 1949 American consumers advocated lower 
agricultural price supports to control food costs. Consumers, particularly those in urban areas, had become a new 
and increasingly vocal and powerful voice that gained the attention of Congress; soon agricultural policy would be 
based partly on the needs of this constituency. Some people advocated solving the surplus-production problem 
through massive international relief programs like the Marshall Plan. Others favored using surplus agricultural 
commodities to subsidize school-lunch programs. Critics of these proposals, however, argued that such policies 
would only encourage farmers to keep producing surplus commodities rather than help them shift to production that 
would not need price supports.vii
In 1949 Congress attempted to respond to consumer complaints that commodity price supports increased their 
cost of living. It did so in the Agricultural Act by reducing price supports to between 60 and 90 percent of parity, 
based on the production of specific crops. Congress also changed the parity formula to make price-supported 
commodities dependent on the relationship between farm and nonfarm prices during the most recent ten-year period. 
Larger wheat crops in a given year, for example, would receive a lower price support than smaller crops. Flexible 
price supports theoretically would encourage farmers to reduce production of commodities whose price declined 
because of surplus production, and shift to crops that paid higher price supports. But farmers responded to low 
prices by producing more, particularly grain, to make up for their lost income with greater volume. At the same time 
many farmers wanted continued high price supports for staple commodities that remained in surplus. The federal 
government continued to acquire more commodities through the Commodity Credit Corporation to keep them off 
the market and stabilize prices, but also thereby increasing the cost of the farm program for taxpayers.viii
During the Korean War, the demand for agricultural commodities increased rapidly. When war ended, Congress 
guaranteed that agricultural prices would be supported at 90 percent of parity prices through the 1954 crop year. 
Production remained high, a clear indication to some critics of agricultural policy that parity prices encouraged 
surplus production. Congress continued to grapple with the problems of surplus production while members from 
agricultural states advocated high price supports. Many agricultural economists urged Congress to maintain high 
fixed price supports coupled with production controls as the only means to ensure a satisfactory farm income. 
Despite the efforts of Congress, the farm lobby, and the United States Department of Agriculture, no one knew how 
to solve the problem of surplus production without high price supports and production, that is, acreage, controls. 
Some agriculturists argued that without price supports many farmers would go bankrupt and leave the land. The 
result would be extreme social and economic dislocation. Others contended that government agricultural policy was 
too expensive, and it encouraged surplus production.ix
In 1954, the presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower favored a reduced and flexible price-support 
program based on production to help curb government spending and ease the tax burden. The administration, 
however, immediately encountered the difficulty of reconciling good economic policy with agricultural politics 
because farmers still wielded a significant vote. Although President Eisenhower asked Congress to expand farm 
exports to help reduce price-depressing surpluses and to approve a flexible price-support program based on 
production, Congress could not agree on any of these suggestions. Finally on July 10, 1954, Congress approved the 
Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, Known as Public Law 480. This important legislation 
authorized the federal government to sell surplus agricultural commodities abroad for foreign currency and to use 
surplus commodities for emergency food aid to friendly nations. This legislation became highly political in time, 
with the emphasis on foreign policy rather than improvement of agriculture.x
During the 1950s, then, the problem of overproduction, high price supports, and increased operating costs 
continue to plague the American farmer. Agricultural prices declined while operating costs increased. Farmers 
responded by trying to produce as much as possible on their restricted acres with heavy applications of fertilizers, 
herbicides, and pesticides. This solution not only made the problem worse, but also created new difficulties for 
agriculture and the environment.xi
Change and Continuity, 1963—1977 
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Planning miscalculations during the Great Leap Forward (1958—1960) and bad weather contributed to serious 
agricultural production declines that resulted in the Great Leap Famine (1959—1960). As a result, Chinese 
agricultural policy underwent a major change. During the early 1960s, the Communist Party disbanded the large 
agricultural labor brigades and small teams again had responsibility for farm production. It also restored small-scale 
free markets, subsidized production, and allocated private plots up to 5 percent of a commune’s cultivated land as a 
matter of necessity. These were the first private allocations of lands since the commune system began in the autumn 
of 1958. Farmers could use these plots to raise pigs, chickens, and ducks as well as crops on their own initiative. The 
collective, however, still owned the land and the government required farmers to meet procurement quotas but these 
farmers were otherwise free to make their own production decisions. The government also reduced the grain tax and 
increased prices for quota procurements, and it began providing more resources, especially chemical fertilizer, to the 
communes to help stabilize and increase production. Research institutes, county research stations, and communes 
also tested and purchased new seed varieties for communal farming on team agricultural plots. By 1962, the three-
tier agricultural organizational system of the production team, village brigade, and commune planned, managed and 
conducted all phases of Chinese agriculture. Production increased and the government helped agricultural families 
developed cooperative exchanges to build irrigation systems and reclaim swamp and lake land for crops, but the 
population increased and kept agriculture expansion gradual and labor intensive because farmers cultivated less land 
per capita.xii
In the mid-1970s, the government adjusted its agricultural policy to increase the work of the production teams 
and encourage the farmers to rely more on themselves and make greater sacrifices for the state and commune and 
less for the family. The government continued to determine production quantities of food and fiber and the prices 
paid by state marketing agencies. The state provided the commune officials with an agricultural plan and the 
production brigades determined the goals. Agricultural tools and livestock were also distributed among production 
teams. Brigade leaders decided which fields would be planted and assigned production team members specific tasks, 
such as sowing, cultivating, and harvesting. After the major growing season these farmers tended their own gardens 
and livestock or worked in other assigned activities such as claiming and expanding irrigation systems.xiii
Peasant households received compensation based on their work contribution. Production team income was the 
amount remaining after payments had been made to the state, brigade, and team. The state, for example, required an 
annual land tax payable in cash or commodities and purchased an allocation of grain and other crops at low, fixed 
prices. The brigade deducted earnings for salaries, welfare, and a capital investment fund. The production team paid 
in grain or cash for seed, fertilizer, and tools and contributed to the brigade’s grain reserve. At this point 
approximately 40 to 60 percent of the total agricultural income remained for division among team members based 
on their work points earned during the year.xiv
Officials used several policies to determine work points, such as day or task work. In any case, team work points 
were totaled to determine group income. Each team also received a grain allowance for household distribution based 
on individual work points. The larger households earned more work points and greater compensation, while the 
small households bore the greatest burden for state taxes and brigade costs. Many farmers who had worked to 
acquire land, increase agricultural income, and earn a higher standard of living still had difficulty adjusting to 
government agricultural policy that required them to work for the state and party and not themselves.xv
During the 1970s government officials recognized that although farmers accepted government agricultural policy, 
private gain remained an important motivation for agricultural production. Chinese farmers resented procurement 
and pricing policy and opposed it so strongly that, by the early 1970s, the government stressed that the production 
teams should only increase production and income by adopting more technology through the three-tier 
organizational structure of the commune rather than by personal self-sacrifice.xvi
By the 1960s, urban consumers in the United States continued to pressure Congress for an agricultural policy that 
would contribute to lower food prices, while farmers and agribusinesses and farm organizations often sought 
maximum production and maximum price supports. At the same time, the farm population continued to decrease, 
and representatives from farm districts held fewer seats in the Congress. With less than 10 percent of the population 
engaged in farming, Congress could ignore the farm vote more than ever before. Congress began to listen to the 
special commodity groups for technical information as well as funding for election campaigns. Rural congressmen 
also depended on the support of their urban colleagues for farm legislation. Compromise became more important 
than before, with rural congressmen usually promising to support food-stamp and other social programs in return for 
urban congressional support for agricultural legislation. Failure to support agricultural legislation no longer meant 
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that a congressman would face difficult reelection odds. Disagreements and vacillation often prevailed before 
compromise could be reached on agricultural policy.xvii
Democratic-controlled congresses and Republican presidents often clashed after World War II over agricultural 
policy. Republican congressmen generally favored flexible price supports and the removal of the federal 
government from agriculture to allow the marketplace to dictate demand and prices, thereby influencing production 
and supply. Democratic congressmen advocated governmental intervention to achieve economic and social ends for 
agriculture and rural communities. Congressmen from both parties increasingly relied on the president and the 
secretary of agriculture and the commodity organizations to propose farm legislation, but they did not automatically 
approve administration proposals. Often they rejected suggestions for policy changes because of a host of political 
considerations.xviii
During the early 1960s, science and technology had defeated all efforts to reduce surplus production and increase 
farm prices. At the same time, Congress became increasingly concerned with urban problems, and a consumer 
movement opposed price-support programs because they increased food costs while guaranteeing a certain level of 
farm income. Agricultural policy no longer remained the domain of farmers and their lobbying groups.xix
In 1961, President John F. Kennedy supported mandatory production controls to reduce surplus production and 
higher price supports to maintain farm income. Congress responded by providing a supply-management agricultural 
policy designed to gain high agricultural prices by restricting farm production. It authorized a crop reduction 
program that enabled farmers to receive surplus grain held in government storage in payment for participation. 
Farmers could then sell that grain thereby reducing price depressing reserves while decreasing planted acreage, 
particularly for grain. With this Agricultural Act of 1961, Congress also expanded the school lunch program, and in 
1964, Congress approved a food stamp program to increase the consumption of agricultural commodities the 
government had purchased through its price support programs.xx
By the 1970s, then, the federal government and the major farm organizations continued to wrestle with ideas for 
regulating production while maintaining adequate prices. No one had quick or easy answers to solve the farm 
problem, but farm policy occupied as much time in Congress as any domestic policy issue. A coherent farm policy 
that would balance production with demand while maintaining acceptable prices became increasingly difficult 
because farmers had too many conflicting interests. Essentially, into the 1970s farm policy remained tied to the 
ideas developed during the 1930s to control production, reduce surpluses, and increase prices and income. Although 
most farmers opposed mandatory production and marketing controls, they favored government aid in the form of 
price supports for voluntary acreage reduction for specific crops to ensure an income floor. Given increased 
operating costs and farmer inability to organize and bargain collectively, they remained dependent on the federal 
movement. Without base price supports, the exodus from the farm would have been even greater. Farmers continued 
to use government to protect their interests.xxi
Reform and Stability 1978—1996 
In the immediate post-Mao period from 1978—1983, government officials substantially changed agricultural 
policy. In less than a decade policy makers had dismantled the people’s commune. Equally important, collective 
land came under the control of individual farmers through the household responsibility system. As a result, Chinese 
agriculture became based on individual initiative and decision making rather than collective planning and action. 
This was nothing less than a peaceful revolution in agricultural policy. Government officials also believed that the 
household responsibility system would enable farmers to afford more investment for improved seeds, fertilizer, and 
equipment. The government also increased the price of grain sold by quota by 20 percent while grain sold above the 
quota increased 50 percent. When these efforts failed to increase production quickly, Chinese officials began 
rethinking agricultural policy. The result was a return to the agricultural reforms of the early 1960s which ended 
with the Cultural Revolution.xxii
Specifically, in 1979, Chinese leaders analyzed agriculture and concluded that the farmers lacked initiatives to 
increase production and that they misused the land. In a document entitled “Decisions Concerning the Rapid 
Development of Agriculture,” agricultural leaders planned a number of major reforms, implementation of the 
“household responsibility system,” and encouragement of diversification and specialization, all intended to increase 
productivity and farm income. Officials now placed emphasis on diversification of production and decentralization 
of farm management patterns. In the late 1980s, they also included expansion of the local private markets as well as 
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an increase in the number of private plots in the communes. Overall, this new agricultural policy was called the 
“agricultural production responsibility system” and commonly known as the “household responsibility system” 
which the government announced in 1983 although it began as early as 1978 on an experimental basis. Family 
farmers still paid an agricultural tax, met their mandated quota of agricultural production, and paid the fees owed to 
the collective. Agricultural production above the mandated quota for the government, however, could be used as the 
farmers saw fit—sold to the state at above procurement prices, sold on local markets, or consumed. As a result, the 
commune system essentially terminated and the production brigades gained control over the farm land. By the mid-
1980s, nearly all agricultural production was conducted on a household basis and the terms “commune” and 
“production brigade” reverted to “township” and “village.” Production procurement contracts, however, remained at 
least through 1987. By the mid-1980s, China was a net exporter of grain. Agricultural reformers argued that the 
household responsibility system was compatible with socialism because the land remained in the collective control 
of the state. Farmers still did not own land; they merely contracted to use it on their own terms, that is, privately. 
Moreover, state planning for the production and procurement of wheat and cotton and other farm products remained 
a basic feature of Chinese agricultural policy.xxiii
Individual remuneration now depended on production rather than work points. By the mid-1980s, more than 90 
percent of rural families pursued farming based on reward for individual or family production. The production team 
contracted the land to individual households and collected a portion of the produce, such as grain, for payment of the 
agricultural tax and contribution to the welfare fund. The farm family, however, could raise any crop and keep all 
produce above the quota payment. Essentially, the relationship became that of the land-lord tenant system of 
traditional China and the share rent system in the United States. Many farmers hailed this policy as the “second land 
reform,” referring to the distribution of land for individual, that is, private cultivation during the early 1950s.xxiv
In the mid-1980s, the government changed agricultural policy still further by ending the requirement of 
mandatory quotas, that is, crops that had to be sold to the government. The government would no longer serve as a 
monopoly for the purchase and marketing of grain, cotton, and other agricultural commodities. The government 
announced, however, that it would purchase certain quantities of select commodities, such as grain and cotton, at 
contracted prices. Farmers could contract for sale to the government or sell only on private markets. At the same 
time, the government guaranteed the purchase of all commodities at a minimum floor price if the farmers could not 
find a private market. This policy reduced government expenses and provided more options for farmers. The 
government encouraged contract grain production by providing chemical fertilizer at below market prices, tax 
reductions, and low interest loans to famers who participated in the contract program.xxv
The state also relaxed price controls on many agricultural products such as meat, eggs, and vegetables, and the 
prices rose 9 percent. Essentially, this agricultural policy began the transformation of agriculture from a collective 
enterprise to a family, that is, private operation. Still farmers worried about the return to collective principles. 
Chinese officials also reaffirmed their commitment to the household responsibility system by extending land 
contracts to fifteen years, while assuring farmers that agricultural policy would not soon change. This agricultural 
policy clearly indicated flexibility and practicality on the part of Chinese leaders. By the mid-1980s, this agricultural 
policy had increased production, changed cropping patterns, and increased agricultural income. It also encouraged a 
reasonably successful union of the socialist collective system and the individual, though not entirely private, 
household responsibility system.xxvi
In 1994, responding to economic and social stability in the countryside, government officials extended land 
contracts to thirty years and encouraged farmers to cultivate on an “optimum scale” in certain circumstances, a 
version perhaps of the American axiom that bigger is better. Clearly, government officials recognized the 
relationship between farm income and productivity. The government also raised procurement prices to ease 
inflationary burdens on farmers, and it substantially increased its investment in agriculture. The government, 
however, did not stem arbitrary procurements by local officials. Even so, by the turn of the twenty-first century, 
agricultural advocates retained their voice in the shaping of agricultural policy.xxvii
In contrast, by the mid-1980s, American agricultural policy had been based on supply and demand for a half 
century. The federal government provided financing for the storage of grain and fiber on farms or by private grain 
elevators and warehouses. This policy enabled farmers to hold their crop until a price increase merited sale, or they 
could sell it to the government with no requirement to pay the difference if the price fell below the loan rate, that is, 
the government price. American agricultural policy also enabled the federal government to make “deficiency 
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payments” that is, cash payments directly to farmers if agricultural prices fell below government established “target 
prices.”xxviii
During the mid-1980s, overproduction, low prices, and high government costs continued to plague the farm 
program. In 1985, Congress once again attempted to solve the farm problem, with the Food Security Act. This 
legislation attempted to maintain farm income while reducing costs, and it covered five crop years. During that time, 
target prices would fall closer to market demands and help reduce government spending. It also provided for acreage 
reductions if agricultural supplies became excessive. This legislation did not solve the problems of overproduction 
and low prices. The basic price support, production, and marketing philosophy for farm policy, then, remained little 
changed since the 1930s. By the early 1990s, however, American agricultural policy had not solved the problems of 
an imbalance of supply and demand, an inadequate income for family farmers, or an escalating national debt.xxix
By the 1990s, then, farmers continued to face criticism from urbanites and consumers about the annual cost of the 
agricultural program that enabled farmers to receive payments from the government. Some critics advocated a 
complete abandonment of agricultural subsidies in favor of a free market, unprotected by tariffs for agricultural 
commodities. Others favored reform by eliminating payments based on production and marketing and the 
substitution of payments based on short-term economic need. In addition, by the mid-1990s nearly all the New Deal 
(1930s) agricultural legislation remained in effect, based on the Agricultural Act of 1938 as amended by the 
Agricultural Act of 1949. These polices continued to create surpluses, force people from the land, reduce the number 
of farms, and contribute to the decline of small-scale family farms while encouraging, even necessitating, the 
dependency of farmers on the federal government for survival while expanding the regulatory state of American 
agriculture. In 1996, however, a Republican-controlled House and Senate moved to radically change agricultural 
policy by ending production control payments while letting the market economy determine farm prices. The 
resulting Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, also known as the Freedom to Farm Act or 
FAIR Act, was the first major change in farm policy since 1949, and it provided the foundation for a major change 
in agricultural policy. This legislation authorized a descending level of payments for production and price-
supporting loan programs regardless of supply and commodity prices. While farmers continued to receive federal 
payments for participating in various programs, they could now produce any crop in any amount that they desired 
without acreage limitations. Farmers, then, could have maximum production, plus government payments for 
participating in various programs. At the end of seven years, however, the commodity price-supporting payments 
would end, and agricultural prices would depend on supply and demand. Presumably farmers would produce less 
surplus, low-priced commodities and more products for which surpluses did not exist and which, therefore, brought 
higher prices, which meant increased farm income. Many agricultural experts and farmers expected this policy to 
fail.xxx
The Age of Uncertainty, 1997-Present 
By the late 1990s, Chinese farmers remained concerned about agricultural prices, taxes, and stability of 
agricultural policy. Although they did not have organized agricultural groups or associations that served as interest 
groups, rural deputies to the National People’s Congress served as farm advocates. Advocates for Chinese 
agriculture also came from agricultural research institutes of the State Council and Central Committee as well as the 
academies and universities, and the Ministry of Agriculture, while others championed agricultural improvement as 
editors and journalists. By the last decade of the twentieth century party leaders also had the responsibility to help 
farmers achieve prosperity through the market. Agricultural policy differed markedly in principle and method from 
previous farm policy that promoted collectivist and egalitarian policies and principles. By the end of the twentieth 
century, Chinese government officials and agricultural advocates increasingly spoke about the “legitimate rights and 
interests of farmers.”xxxi
By the late 1990s, Chinese agricultural policy, however, still required some farmers to produce a specific 
allocation of grain, and the government purchased more than 50 percent of that production at fixed prices. Like the 
United States, China still had too many farmers who could not earn a satisfactory income from the land. Indeed, by 
1995, approximately 50 million more farmers worked the land than in 1978, when significant reform began for 
agricultural policy. China’s minister of agriculture believed that 33 percent of the 438 million agricultural workers 
was “surplus” labor. Moreover, while the government grain purchases helped ensure food security and kept food 
prices low for urban workers, this policy hindered agricultural diversification based on production decisions of 
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farmers and a market economy. In contrast to American agricultural policy, the Chinese government used 
administrative measures to control grain prices and reserves, rather than a market economy.xxxii
In retrospect, Chinese agricultural policy has enabled considerable improvement in the standard of living since 
1949. In that year China ranked among the worst-fed nations. Since the mid-twentieth century, its agricultural 
policies, particularly after 1978 have made it one of the most successful countries that reduced hunger by rapidly 
increasing agricultural production, particularly grain. At the turn of the twenty-first century, China consumed 
approximately 410 million tons of grain, but imported only about 2 percent of that amount. Problems of adequate 
food production lay in the past. Equally important, China’s agricultural policy has kept food affordable, because 
officials recognized that eliminating hunger is not only a matter of increasing production but also keeping food 
affordable, both of which involve the formulation and execution of agricultural policy. This achievement is a 
remarkable accomplishment since the famine of 1959—1960 that claimed 30 million lives. Most significantly by the 
turn of the twenty-first century one of China’s major agricultural problems became surpluses, particularly grain; the 
second low farm prices. Moreover, agricultural production growth rates have exceeded population growth rates 
since 1979.xxxiii
In August 2002, the Ninth National People’s Congress adopted the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 
Land Contract in Rural Areas (Order of the President No. 73). This act affirmed State ownership of the land and the 
right of farmers to contract land from the collective organization in the villages. The law permitted farmers to 
contract land for thirty years, make all production and operating decisions, and sell their produce or commodities. In 
order to encourage farmers to improve their land, the law ensured that they would receive compensation if they had 
to cancel their contracts. By 2006, however, only an estimated 40 percent of farm households had contracted or at 
least received land contracts. The reason for this low percentage stems from the reluctance of farmers to make long-
term investments on their land, fearing confiscation by local or regional authorities without compensation as well as 
from bureaucratic inefficiency to administer the program. Despite these problems the Land Contract in Rural Areas 
act was one of the most important pieces of agricultural legislation in recent years, because it addressed the rights of 
farmers.xxxiv
In contrast, in the United States, the high prices that farmers received for their crops and which exceeded 
government price supports collapsed in the late 1990s due to overproduction and economic recession in Asia and 
Latin America, which sharply reduced foreign sales. As agricultural prices fell below target prices Congress 
responded by making “emergency” direct cash payments to farmers along with increased deficiency payments. By 
2001 the federal government had spent $71 billion in direct cash payments to farmers for emergency aid and 
deficiency and conservation payments, or more than three times the money that they were scheduled to receive in 
1996.xxxv
In early 2002, as Congress debated and approved new farm legislation to take effect the next year, payments for 
commodity reduction as well as various conservation practices returned as basic features of agricultural policy. 
Opponents believed this new agricultural legislation would encourage the production of commodities already in 
surplus, benefit only large-scale producers, and burden the federal treasury with exorbitant costs. They were correct 
on all counts. With the new farm legislation, known as the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, providing $82 
billion for various programs over ten years, with payments to farmers who produced major commodities based on 
production controls linked to designated soil conservation practices, supporters praised the new farm legislation as 
an important safety net to protect farm income. American farmers, then, entered the twenty-first century still reliant 
on the federal government for economic support that often meant the difference between survival and abandonment 
of their farming operations.xxxvi
In June 2008, Congress passed the Food, Conservation and Energy Act. Although Congress no longer 
specifically paid farmers to reduce acreage for certain surplus crops, such as wheat and cotton, this legislation 
provided payments to farmers who withdrew marginal land from production for conservation purposes. It also 
continued to furnish an economic safety net for farmers by providing increased direct monetary payments to them 
when prices declined, and it preserved the marking loan program that had been in effect since 1933. Thus, Congress 
essentially continued past agricultural policy with a slightly different structure. Overall, American agricultural 
policy had changed little since the 1930s. The federal government continued to make a major financial commitment 
to help ensure a satisfactory income and standard of living for American farmers.xxxvii
Conclusion 
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What generalizations, then, can scholars make when comparing the agricultural policies of the United States and 
China, given their considerably different political systems? In any transnational and comparative study differences 
often appear the most recognizable, if not important features, but similarities also are important. In this case several 
generalizations may help historians who teach and research agricultural history from a world or global perspective. 
First, Chinese and American farmers have had a voice, expressed in different ways that has influenced the shape of 
agricultural policy. Second, both Chinese and American farmers have wanted more economic gain to improve their 
standard of living, and both governments attempted to increase income using different methods. Third, both nations 
had too many farmers, which Chinese policy attempted to keep on the land while American policy encouraged them 
to leave. Fourth, farmers in both nations had little choice but to accept their nation’s agricultural policy. Fifth, the 
goal of food security has driven the agricultural policies of both nations. Indeed, during the economic reform period 
that began in 1978, Chinese agricultural officials preferred food security in grain based on mandatory production 
and procurement regulations and price controls. At the same time, the United States sought food security by 
maintaining an “ever normal granary” through loan and storage agreements that essentially gave the federal 
government control of large quantities of grain. Sixth, agricultural policy has been expensive for both nations. 
Seventh, the fundamental principles of agricultural policy have changed more frequently in China than in the United 
States.xxxviii
China, of course, had different urban and industrial needs than the United States. Agricultural policy that 
mandated grain production and price controls were intended to supply adequate food at reasonable prices for 
workers and urbanites. It also helped ensure raw materials for industry. Yet, American agricultural policy, with its 
price support and government purchase programs through the Commodity Credit Corporation, essentially 
encouraged grain production, and a food reserve while providing an acceptable standard of living for farm families. 
Perhaps the greatest difference between these two systems stems from the necessity of China to harmonize 
economic and social considerations with its political system, although its agricultural policy was considerably more 
flexible by the late twentieth than during the mid-twentieth century. Even so, the government of the United States 
has had to reconcile farm policy with politics because farmers and their interest groups have wielded great influence 
at the ballot box.xxxix
These are a few transitional and comparative generalizations that scholars can use in the classroom or to enhance 
their research. Agricultural policy in both nations has been complex, often characterized by considerable political in-
fighting, compromise, and sometimes changes. It can be a quagmire for historical learning, but scholars must 
understand and teach it because the social and economic development of both nations has depended on agricultural 
policy for more than half of the twentieth century. 
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